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Background: Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is of major concern to the swine industry;
infection with the virus can lead to production losses, morbidity, and mortality within swine operations. Biosecurity
practices related to the management of replacement animals are important for the prevention and control of the
PRRS virus, as well as other diseases. The objectives of this study were: (i) to describe individual biosecurity practices
related to the introduction and transportation of replacement gilts on southern Ontario sow farms, and (ii) to
understand patterns in the implementation of these practices. The second objective was accomplished using
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), which allows visualization of the relationships between individual practices
and provides information about which practices frequently occur together, and which practices rarely occur
together. These patterns constitute strategies for the implementation of biosecurity practices related to the
introduction and transportation of replacement gilts. Data were collected using version 2 of the Production Animal
Disease Risk Assessment Program’s survey for the breeding herd. Two subsets of variables were retained for analysis;
one subset pertained to how replacements were managed upon arrival to the farm, and the other pertained to the
transportation of genetic animals.
Results: For both subsets of variables, the results of the MCA procedure were similar; in both solutions the 1st
dimension separated herds that were closed with respect to replacement animals from herds that were open, and
the 2nd dimension described how open herds managed replacements. The most interesting finding of this study
was that, in some cases where a risky practice was being implemented, it was closely associated with other
biosecurity practices that may mitigate that risk.
Conclusions: The findings from this approach suggest that one cannot always examine biosecurity on a
variable-by-variable basis. Even if a practice that is generally considered high-risk is being implemented, it may be
balanced by other practices that mitigate that risk. Thus, the overall biosecurity strategy on a farm must be
considered instead of only examining the implementation of individual practices.
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Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS)
virus is of major concern to the swine industry world-
wide. Clinical signs associated with infection include
inappetance, lethargy, depression, pyrexia, respiratory
distress, premature farrowing, and increases in stillborn
or poor-doing piglets and in pre-weaning mortality [1].* Correspondence: kbottoms@uoguelph.ca
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orDirect contact between an infected, pathogen-shedding
pig and one that is susceptible to infection is the most
important route of transmission for most infectious dis-
eases of swine, including the PRRS virus (PRRSV) [2-4].
Given the importance of this virus to the swine industry
and its potential impact on the welfare and productivity
of pigs, gilt replacement strategies are essential for
the prevention and control of PRRS [5]. Such strategies
pertain to the source from which replacements are
obtained, how replacement gilts are managed upon ar-
rival to the farm, and the protocols used for theirl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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particularly important because they allow for separation
between replacement animals of unknown disease status
and the main herd. One recent study examined gilt re-
placement strategies in Quebec and provided descriptive
information about practices related to the purchase and
introduction of gilts [5]. The authors found that some
practices were not adequately applied, and identified
specific factors that may increase the risk of PRRSV
introduction or re-circulation in sow herds [5].
Previous work by this research group found that exter-
nal biosecurity on sow farms in southern Ontario was
best described by three groups: two of which were con-
sidered to have high biosecurity standards, and one of
which was considered to have low biosecurity standards.
The most important variables in differentiating between
these groups related to the source of replacement ani-
mals and transportation practices [6]. Thus, the objec-
tives of this study were: (i) to describe individual
biosecurity practices related to the introduction and
transportation of replacement gilts on southern Ontario
sow farms, and (ii) to understand patterns in the imple-
mentation of these practices.Methods
Questionnaire
Information about breeding animal replacement strat-
egies on sow farms in southern Ontario was obtained
from the Production Animal Disease Risk Assessment
Program’s (PADRAP) survey for the breeding herd [7].
This survey was originally developed to assess the risk of
PRRSV introduction and spread within a herd and is
widely used by swine practitioners in North America.
Version 2 of the survey was used for the study; this ver-
sion contains 179 questions and is divided into three
sections that address demographic information, internal
risks, and external risks.Herd inclusion and interviews
The source population for this study was southern
Ontario sow herds. The sampling strategy for data col-
lection has been reported previously [6]. In brief, herds
were eligible for inclusion in the study if they were
located in southern Ontario and if sows were present
on-site. Information about the study was communicated
at the Ontario Association of Swine Veterinarians
(OASV) meetings and through the listserv. Swine veteri-
narians provided contact information for herds that were
eligible to participate. A total of 161 swine sites were
included in the study, and the study period ran from
April through August of 2007. Interviews were con-
ducted by three veterinary students who had previous
experience in the swine industry. When required,additional information regarding disease status was
obtained from the herd veterinarian.
Multiple correspondence analysis
Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) (SPSS 19.0,
SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) is a multivariate technique that
is used to visualize relationships within a set of categor-
ical variables [8]. This method is often used to analyze
survey data, where each variable corresponds to a ques-
tion, and the categories of each variable correspond to
the possible responses [9]. There is no outcome variable
with this particular method; instead, the procedure iden-
tifies patterns among responses to the selected variables.
Variables that are used in the MCA solution, such as
biosecurity practices, are classified as “active” variables.
This method also allows the use of “supplementary” vari-
ables; these variables are not used in the calculations
and have no influence on the solution, but are displayed
on the output and aid in interpretation of the active vari-
able categories [8,10].
In the MCA output, relationships between different
categories of the selected variables are typically repre-
sented as points in a two-dimensional space; the first
and second dimensions being the X and Y axes of the
graph. As it pertains to this study, biosecurity practices
that tend to occur together are plotted close to each
other, and biosecurity practices that rarely occur to-
gether are plotted further apart [10]. The output plot is
usually organized such that each variable is assigned a
symbol, and each of the responses to that particular
variable are labelled beside each of the symbols. For
example, if a variable of interest is assigned a black
square and has 3 possible responses, the plot will
contain 3 black squares, each labelled to indicate which
variable category it refers to. The plot is interpreted by
considering which variable categories are plotted closely
together; relatedness between variables is considered in
both the 1st dimension along the X axis, and in the 2nd
dimension along the Y axis. Similarly, the distribution of
observations that are similar is plotted as part of the
MCA output; this provides information about which
herds are similar in the 1st the 2nd dimensions.
This method has been used previously to describe bio-
security and management practices in Belgian swine
herds [10]. In the current study, variables relating to
both internal and external risk were selected for MCA.
Variables of interest were subdivided into two groups:
those pertaining to how replacements were handled
upon arrival to the recipient farm, and those pertaining
to the transportation of replacements. Introduction
variables provided information about the number of re-
placement sources in the previous 2 years; where repla-
cements were obtained from; PRRSV status of the
source herds(s); whether replacements were exposed to
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posure; and how replacements were handled in terms
of isolation and acclimation (Table 1). Transportation
variables addressed the frequency of replacement deliv-
eries to the site; the cleaning and disinfection of trucks
carrying genetic animals; and whether there were flow,
route, transit, or use restrictions during transportation
(Table 2).
The PADRAP questionnaire was designed such that
responses are ordered from highest to lowest risk; we
maintained the original ordering, and a value of 5 was
assigned to the most risky behaviour. The remaining cat-
egories were assigned values in descending order. In the
case of dichotomous variables, a value of 5 was assigned
to the response with the highest risk, and a value of 1
was assigned to the response with the lowest risk.
Reponses of “not applicable” were assigned a value of 9,
in order to make our interpretation of the MCA plot
straightforward.
In both MCA solutions, two supplementary variables
were included (Table 3): PRRSV status and biosecurity
group membership. Each farm was defined as PRRSV-
positive, negative or naïve at the time the interview was
conducted. According to this version of the PADRAP
questionnaire, a positive status indicates that the herd
was positive on ELISA and may or may not have been
producing infected weaned pigs. A negative status indi-
cates that the herd still contained previously exposed
animals, and a naïve status indicates that the entire
herd had never been exposed to the PRRS virus. Infor-
mation regarding biosecurity group membership for
each of the farms was obtained from previous work by
this research group. In that study, the same dataset set
was used, and a different subset of variables was offered
to cluster analysis. Three external biosecurity groups
were identified and named by the authors as: (i) high
biosecurity herds that were open with respect to re-
placement animals; (ii) high biosecurity herds that were
closed with respect to replacement animals; (iii) low
biosecurity herds [6].Results
Demographic information
Our sample of 161 sow herds consisted of 3 herd types:
45.3% were farrow-to-finish, 42.9% were farrow-to-wean,
and 11.8% were farrow-to-feeder operations. The num-
ber of sows on the premises ranged from 45 to 3500,
with a mean of 800.3. In terms of production type,
81.1% of the farms included in the study were com-
mercial operations, and 18.9% were breeding herds that
produced animals for replacement and genetic improve-
ment. Information about the supplementary variables is
presented in Table 3. Of the herds that were positive forthe PRRS virus, 81.3% were stable, 15.9% were unstable,
and 2.8% were of unknown stability.
Multiple correspondence analysis for the introduction
of replacement gilts
Variables pertaining to the introduction of replacement
gilts are presented in Table 1. The MCA solution is pre-
sented in Figure 1, and the plot showing the distribution
of herds is presented in Figure 2. The total variance
explained by the solution was 63.7%, with 42.7%
explained by the 1st dimension and 21% by the 2nd di-
mension. Discrimination measures provide insight into
the influence exerted by each variable [10]. Variables
with the highest discrimination are presented in Table 4.
The 1st dimension separates practices related to herds
that are closed with respect to replacement animals from
practices related to herds that are open. The most in-
formative variable in this respect is the source of re-
placement animals. On the left side of the 1st dimension
are variable categories associated with closed herds:
“closed site (replacements are born and raised at site
and never moved from site)” and “closed herd at this
site (replacements are born at site, moved to another
site and later returned as replacements)”. On the right
side of the 1st dimension are categories associated with
open herds: “some or all from other sites outside the
pig flow but within the same production system, none
from outside the production system” and “some or all
purchased from other production systems/genetic sup-
pliers”. The intermediate category of “some or all from
other sites within the same pig flow as this site (e.g.,
downstream nursery or grow/finish/developer), none
from outside the same pig flow” is located exactly in the
centre. Other variables confirm this separation of open
and closed herds along the 1st dimension. The left side
of this plot is dominated by responses of “not applic-
able” for all variables pertaining to the isolation and ac-
climation of replacement animals, and contains the
response of “zero replacement sources in the last 2
years”. Alternatively, the right side of the 1st dimension
contains practices that are associated with open herds.
For example: for the location of isolation housing,
responses of “on-site” and “off-site” are located on the
right side of the plot, whereas the response of “not ap-
plicable” is located on the left. The closed biosecurity
group, and PRRSV-negative and naïve categories also
fall in this region of the plot. The right side of the 1st
dimension includes the high and low biosecurity groups,
and the PRRSV-positive category.
The 2nd dimension provides insight into how open
herds manage replacement animals. In this plot, the
lower right quadrant generally represents the least risky
response patterns. The number of replacement sources
in the previous 2 years, at 4 or more, was high. However,
Table 1 Active variables used in multiple correspondence analysis for the introduction of replacement animals, on 161




a. Time (days) between last natural exposure of replacements to
live animals or feedback and entry into breeding herd
0 days 5 20.5%
1 to 60 days 4 6.8%
61 to 90 days 3 1.9%
91 days or more 2 0.6%
Not applicable 9 70.2%
b. Replacements are exposed to serum from viremic pigs or
sows via injection prior to entry
Yes 5 14.3%
No 1 85.7%
c. Time (days) between last exposure to injected serum and
entry of replacements into breeding herd
0 days 5 1.9%
1 to 60 days 4 5%
61 to 90 days 3 4.3%
91 days or more 2 0.6%
Not applicable 9 88.2%
d. Number of breeding herd sources from which replacements
have been obtained in last two years





e. Source of replacement animals Some or all purchased from other production
systems/genetic suppliers
5 52.2%
Some or all from other sites outside the pig
flow but within the same production system,
none from outside the production system
4 4.3%
Some or all from other sites within the same
pig flow as this site (e.g., downstream nursery
or grow/finish/developer), none from
outside the same pig flow
3 3.7%
Closed herd at this site (replacements are born
at site, moved to another site and later returned
as replacements)
2 9.3%
Closed site (replacements are born and raised
at site and never moved from site)
1 30.4%
f. PRRS virus status of breeding herd(s) from which replacements
are sourced
One or more sources positive active – this is
positive by ELISA and producing PRRSV infected
weaned pigs
5 8.7%
One or more sources with unknown status,
none positive active
4 1.9%
One or more sources positive stable – that is
positive by ELISA but producing non-infected
weaned pigs, none positive active or unknown
status
3 34.2%
All sources currently negative by ELISA but one
or more have been positive in the past
2 40.4%
All sources have always been negative (naive) 1 14.9%
g. PRRS virus status of breeding female replacements in
isolation/acclimation
Negative at entry but field virus positive from
natural exposure at exit
5 18.6%
Field virus positive from natural exposure
at entry
4 15.5%
Negative at entry & negative at exit 3 29.2%
Not applicable 9 36.6%
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Table 1 Active variables used in multiple correspondence analysis for the introduction of replacement animals, on 161
southern Ontario sow farms (Continued)
h. Response when group of replacement animals in
isolation/acclimation becomes positive by PCR or ELISA
to PRRS virus from natural field virus exposure
Introduced into breeding herd on regular
schedule
5 14.9%
Introduced into breeding herd after holding
period of less than 30 days
4 4.3%
Introduced into breeding herd after 30 to
90 day holding period
3 11.2%
Introduced into breeding herd after holding
period of more than 90 days
2 2.5%
Replacements are marketed and not used
for breeding purposes
1 26.1%
Not applicable 9 41%
i. Isolation/acclimation period (days) 0 or less 5 41.3%
1 to 60 days 4 41.3%
61 to 90 days 3 8.8%
91 to 120 days 2 5.6%
121 days or more 1 3.1%
j. Replacement animal acclimation flow Continuous flow 5 28%
All in/all out by room 4 3.7%
All in/all out by barn 3 3.1%
All in/all out by site 2 0.6%
Not applicable 9 64.6%
k. Replacement animal isolation flow Continuous flow 5 20.5%
All in/all out by room 4 12.4%
All in/all out by barn 3 13.7%
All in/all out by site 2 0.6%
Not applicable 9 52.8%
l. Location of replacement animal acclimation
housing relative to this site
On-site in same air space as sow herd 5 19.3%
On-site in different air space as sow herd 4 10.6%
Off-site (different site from sow herd) 3 5.6%
Not applicable 9 64.6%
m. Location of replacement animal isolation
housing relative to this site
On-site in same air space as sow herd 5 4.3%
On-site in different air space as sow herd 4 28.6%
Off-site (different site from sow herd) 3 14.9%
Not applicable 9 52.2%
n. Serum testing of replacement animals for
PRRS virus or antibodies by PCR or ELISA upon
entry into acclimation/isolation site(s)
No routine testing done 5 66.5%
A sample subset of incoming animals are
tested upon entry
4 4.3%
All incoming animals are bled and tested
upon entry
3 0.6%
Not applicable 9 28.6%
o. Serum testing of replacement animals for
PRRS virus or antibodies by PCR or ELISA upon
exit from acclimation/isolation site(s)
No routine testing done 5 59%
A sample subset of incoming animals are
tested upon entry
4 11.8%
All incoming animals are bled and tested
upon entry
3 1.9%
Not applicable 9 27.3%
Note: for some variables, there may have been additional response options that were not selected by any of the herds in our sample. These categories are not
presented in the table.
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Table 2 Active variables used in multiple correspondence analysis for the transportation of replacement animals,




p. Frequency of replacement deliveries to this site
(days between deliveries)
30 or less 5 37.3%
31 to 45 days 4 6.2%
46 to 60 days 3 18%
61 to 90 days 2 10.6%
91 days or more 1 7.5%
Not applicable 9 20.5%
q. Flow restrictions on vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
No restrictions, the same vehicle may haul PRRSV positive
and negative animals
5 14.3%
The same vehicle can haul PRRSV positive and negative
animals but a minimum downtime is required before
visits to negative sites following last visit to positive site
4 19.9%
The same vehicle never hauls both PRRSV positive and
negative animals
3 21.7%
Truck(s) are dedicated to this site and do not haul
animals from other sites
2 44.1%
r. Route restrictions on vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
No special route selection practices 5 70.2%
Transport routes are outlined proactively to avoid roads
with swine and swine-related sites along the route
1 29.8%
s. Transit restriction on vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
Transport vehicles are allowed to stop en route 5 42.2%
Transport vehicles are allowed to stop en route only at
designated times and locations
4 8.1%
Transport vehicles are never allowed to stop en route 3 49.7%
t. Use restrictions on vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
Vehicles used to transport genetic animals to and from
other sites within the production system may transport
non-genetic animals or animals to market or collection
points
5 32.9%
Vehicles used to transport genetic animals to and from
other sites within the production system are not used
to transport non-genetic animals or animals to market
or collection points
1 67.1%
u. Washing frequency of vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
Never, rarely, or unknown 5 1.9%
At least once per 20 loads 4 2.5%
At least once per 10 loads 3 8.8%
Between every load 2 48.1%
Not applicable 9 38.8%
v. Pre-rinse with water to flush away loose organic
material prior to wash of vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
Unknown 5 8.8%
No, pre-rinse not done 4 3.8%
Yes, fresh water used 3 48.8%
Not applicable 9 38.8%
w. Disinfectant use on vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
No disinfectant used or unknown 5 25%
Phenol-based compound (BioPhene, Environ, Tek-Trol,
Laro, Lysol) or aldehydes (DC&R, Cidex, Formaldegen)
used
4 3.1%
Quarternary ammonium (Roccal, Germex, Zephiran,
Hi-Lethol, BioSentry) used
3 2.5%
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Table 2 Active variables used in multiple correspondence analysis for the transportation of replacement animals,
on 161 southern Ontario sow farms (Continued)
Iodine (Wescodyne, Premise, Iofec, Iosdyn, Losan) or
quarternary ammonium combinations (Synergize,
Aseptol) used
Not applicable 9 38.8%
x. Drying time following wash of vehicles used to
transport genetic animals
No requirements 5 3.8%
Vehicles allowed to dry completely before next load 4 53.8%
Assisted drying technology is used to dry washed
vehicles
3 5.6%
Not applicable 9 36.9%
Note: for some variables, there may have been additional response options that were not selected by any of the herds in our sample. These categories are not
presented in the table.
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sources was mitigated by several factors. These herds
did well in terms of having a long period of time be-
tween the last exposure of replacements to either live
animals, feedback, or injected serum from viremic pigs,
and entry to the main herd. The isolation and acclima-
tion period was long, with the facilities located off-site.
Additionally, all replacements were blood tested for the
PRRS virus upon exit from the isolation/acclimation fa-
cilities. The use of such high standards in the manage-
ment of replacement animals mitigates the risk
associated with using multiple replacement sources.
The PRRSV-positive category is located in this quad-
rant, in close proximity to the high biosecurity group.
About 80% of the PRRSV-positive herds in our sample
were stable.
Alternatively, the most risky responses for the intro-
duction of replacements tended to fall in the upper right
quadrant of Figure 1. In this region, several risky prac-
tices are grouped together: the use of 3 replacement
sources in the previous 2 years, some or all of which
were from other sites outside of the same pig flow, com-
bined with isolation and acclimation facilities located
on-site, is concerning. An isolation/acclimation period of
zero days was found in this quadrant, indicating that in
some cases replacements are introduced directly to the
main herd. The low biosecurity group was located in this
quadrant.Table 3 Supplementary variables used in both multiple
correspondence analysis solutions, on 161 southern
Ontario sow farms
Variable Categories Percentage
PRRS status Positive 66.5%
Negative 21.7%
Naïve 11.8%
Biosecurity group High biosecurity (open) 39.8%
High biosecurity (closed) 26.1%
Low biosecurity 34.2%Multiple correspondence analysis for the transportation
of replacement gilts
Variables used to address strategies for the transporta-
tion of replacement gilts are presented in Table 2. The
MCA solution is presented in Figure 3, and the plot
showing the distribution of herds is presented in
Figure 4. The total variance explained by the solution
was 87.5%, with 58% explained by the 1st dimension and
29.6% by the 2nd dimension. Variables with the highest
discrimination are presented in Table 4.
The 1st dimension, as in the previous solution, sepa-
rates practices related to herds that are closed with re-
spect to replacement animals from practices related to
open herds. The left side of the 1st dimension contains
responses associated with closed herds, while the right
side of the first dimension contains practices that are
associated with open herds. For example: for the variable
regarding the washing frequency of vehicles used to
transport genetic animals, responses of “never, rarely, or
unknown”, “at least once per 20 loads”, “at least once
per 10 loads”, and “between every load” are located on
the right side of the plot, while the response of “not ap-
plicable” is located on the left. This pattern occurs for
variables pertaining to the frequency of replacement de-
liveries, whether trucks are pre-rinsed to remove organic
material, whether disinfectant is used, and regarding dry-
ing time following wash of vehicles. In regards to truck
flow, the practices occurring on the left side of the plot
indicate that trucks transporting genetic animals were
dedicated to the site and did not haul animals from
other sites. The closed biosecurity group falls in this re-
gion of the plot.
The 2nd dimension of this plot demonstrates how
open herds manage the transportation of replacement
animals; practices on either side of the axis represent
relatively different strategies. The upper right quadrant
of this plot represents the least risky responses. Al-
though the same vehicle was allowed to transport both
PRRSV-positive and negative animals, a minimum
downtime was required following a visit to a positive
Figure 1 Multiple correspondence analysis solution for the management of replacement animals upon arrival to the farm, on 161
southern Ontario sow farms. Different categories of biosecurity practices are displayed in this two-dimensional solution that explains most of
the variability in the data. Categories occur closely together if they are correlated in their respective dimensions. The categories of each variable
are labelled in descending numerical order, with a value of 5 indicating the practice considered to have the highest risk. See Table 1 for a
description of which value label corresponds to which category.
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trucks were disinfected using phenol-based compounds,
aldehydes, quarternary ammonium, iodine, or quartern-
ary ammonium combinations. One study evaluated the
efficacy of disinfectants in PRRSV-contaminated trans-
port vehicles, and found that the virus did not persist in
trailers treated with Syngerize and Aseptol disinfectants,
which are quarternary ammonium combinations [11].
The high biosecurity group was also located in this
quadrant.
Alternatively, the most risky responses for all but two
variables fall into the lower right quadrant. In this region
of the plot, several inferior practices are grouped to-
gether: the combination of a lack of flow restrictions on
trucks carrying replacement animals, with infrequent
washing of trucks between loads and the lack of disin-
fectant use are particularly concerning. Also in this
quadrant are the practices of 61–90 days and 91 days or
more between deliveries of replacement animals. These
are considered to be the least risky responses, but this
finding is likely related to herd size. Indeed, when herd
size and frequency of replacement deliveries are com-
pared using the Kruskall-Wallis test, there is a significant
difference in herd size between the different categories
of the frequency of replacement deliveries (P < 0.05).When these same variables are cross-tabulated, the ca-
tegories of 61–90 days and 91 days or more between re-
placement deliveries were associated with the smallest
mean herd sizes.
Discussion
In both MCA solutions the 1st dimension was primarily
related to whether a herd was open or closed with re-
spect to replacement animals, and the 2nd dimension
described how replacement animals are handled in open
herds. The absence of discrete patterns on these plots
indicates broad variation in how different protocols are
applied [10]. The 3rd dimension may provide more
insight into these relationships, however we can obtain
useful information based on the general differences be-
tween the extremes. In both MCA solutions, better prac-
tices are grouped in one quadrant, poorer practices are
grouped in another quadrant, and practices that are
associated with herds being closed with respect to re-
placement animals are grouped together on the left side
of the plot. In previous work by this research group,
two-step cluster analysis identified three external biose-
curity groups using a different subset of variables from
the same dataset [6]. Herds belonging to the high biose-
curity group that was closed with respect to replacement
Figure 2 Distribution of the 161 sow herds used in the multiple correspondence analysis solution for the management of replacement
animals upon arrival to the farm. The numbers on the plot correspond to the herd identification number, and herds that occur closely
together have similar strategies for the introduction of replacement animals.
Table 4 Discrimination measures of variables that were used in multiple correspondence analysis of the introduction
and transportation of replacement animals, on 161 southern Ontario sow farms, the variables with the 5 highest
discrimination measures are presented
Solution Variable Discrimination measure
Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Introduction
variables
PRRS virus status of breeding female replacements in isolation/acclimation 0.749 0.173
Isolation/acclimation period (days) 0.724 0.452
Location of replacement animal isolation housing relative to this site 0.673 0.266
Replacement animal isolation flow 0.664 0.185
Serum testing of replacement animals for PRRS virus or antibodies by PCR or ELISA upon exit from
acclimation/isolation site(s)
0.643 0.103
Time (days) between last exposure to injected serum and entry of replacements into breeding herd 0.127 0.569
Replacements are exposed to serum from viremic pigs or sows via injection prior to entry 0.116 0.527
Location of replacement animal acclimation housing relative to this site 0.338 0.258
Transportation
variables
Pre-rinse with water to flush away loose organic material prior to wash of vehicles used to transport
genetic animals
0.957 0.346
Washing frequency of vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.956 0.285
Disinfectant use on vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.956 0.558
Drying time following wash of vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.921 0.171
Flow restrictions on vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.809 0.330
Transit restriction on vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.253 0.426
Route restrictions on vehicles used to transport genetic animals 0.043 0.287
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Figure 3 Multiple correspondence analysis solution for the transportation of replacement animals, on 161 southern Ontario sow farms.
Different categories of biosecurity practices are displayed in this two-dimensional solution that explains most of the variability in the data.
Categories occur closely together if they are correlated in their respective dimensions. The categories of each variable are labelled in descending
numerical order, with a value of 5 indicating the practice considered to have the highest risk. See Table 2 for a description of which value label
corresponds to which category.
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side the production system, and the movement of ani-
mals was usually via dedicated trucks. Herds belonging
to the high biosecurity group that was open with respect
to replacement animals generally had higher trucking
standards for the movement of animals and feed, and
higher entrance sanitation requirements. Herds belong-
ing to the low biosecurity group tended to rely on re-
placement animals from outside the production system,
and did not have strict policies regarding the trucking of
live animals or feed [6]. In the current study, the loca-
tions of the biosecurity groups on both MCA plots agree
well with previous work. The high biosecurity group that
was closed with respect to replacement animals was
closely associated with responses of “not applicable” for
the introduction and transportation of replacement ani-
mals. In both MCA plots, the high biosecurity group
that was open with respect to replacement animals was
located in the quadrant with the least risky strategies for
the handling of replacement animals, whereas the low
biosecurity group was located in the quadrant with the
most risky set of strategies.
The most important finding of this study is the under-
standing of how individual biosecurity practices form
biosecurity strategies, particularly with respect to theintroduction of replacement gilts into sow herds. Within
these strategies, we can expect to find some practices
that are generally considered high-risk, accompanied by
other biosecurity practices that mitigate the risk. For ex-
ample, in the MCA solution concerning the introduction
of replacement gilts, the practice of having 4 or more re-
placement sources in the previous 2 years was closely
associated with biosecurity practices that mitigated the
associated risk, such as moderate isolation and acclima-
tion periods that occurred in facilities located off-site,
and blood testing of all replacements for PRRSV upon
exit from the isolation/acclimation facilities. In order to
ensure replacements are not viremic, it is advised that
all replacement gilts are tested prior to entry into the
main herd [5]. The use of multiple sources for replace-
ment animals may be a necessity created by modern
pork production systems, in order to facilitate improve-
ments in the breeding program; the strategy described
above mitigates the risk posed by this practice. At the
other extreme are herds that were obtaining gilts from
within the production system, some of which were intro-
ducing them after an isolation/acclimation period of be-
tween 1 and 60 days. Regardless of the source, isolation
and acclimation of replacements is essential. Incoming
pigs may appear healthy but be incubating infection or
Figure 4 Distribution of the 161 sow herds used in the multiple correspondence analysis solution for the transportation of
replacement animals. The numbers on the plot correspond to the herd identification number, and herds that occur closely together have
similar strategies for the transportation of replacement animals.
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transmission to susceptible pigs is increased by the stress
inherent to loading, mixing, and transportation of these
animals [12,13]. Even when using PRRSV-negative sup-
pliers, pigs may come into contact with the virus during
transportation [5]. In the MCA solution concerning the
transportation of replacement animals, some regions of
the plot contain both good and poor practices in close
proximity. Although the 3rd dimension may provide
more insight into these relationships, generally these in-
consistencies indicate broad variation in application of
biosecurity protocols in this particular quadrant of the
MCA plot. It is important to consider that vehicles that
transport livestock are known to play a role in the
spread of PRRSV from contaminated premises, and ve-
hicle cleanliness is important in mitigating the associated
risk [3,14].
The complex interrelationships between these biose-
curity variables cannot be easily examined by correlation
coefficients alone, and MCA has proved useful in that
respect. The findings of this study could have important
implications for the assessment of biosecurity practices,
since our results suggest that infection control should
not rely exclusively on the benchmarking of individual
practices against an ideal standard. Additionally, the en-
tire strategy should be assessed simultaneously; the im-
plementation of such strategies is likely driven by theirfeasibility, cost, and effectiveness. The practical applica-
tion of this finding is that standard-setting agencies
should not only look at promoting specific individual
biosecurity practices. Groups of practices that form
strategies should be examined in order to determine
whether the strategy is designed to effectively reduce the
risk of introducing pathogens. This idea aligns with the
principle of equivalence set forward by the World
Organization for Animal Health, which recognizes that
different approaches to animal health and production
systems can provide equivalent animal and human pro-
tection for the purposes of international trade [15].
Thus, encouraging producers to apply the same biose-
curity standard for every individual practice may be an
over-simplified approach for some aspects of biosecurity,
such as the introduction of replacement gilts.
The results obtained from this study are subject to
some limitations. The herds used in this study represent
a convenience sample that was recruited without a for-
mal selection process; this may be the biggest limitation
of the study. We are unable to provide response rates, as
this study was an industry-based project, and those sta-
tistics were not available to us. Nonetheless, the vari-
ation in herd size within our sample indicates that a
broad variety of management styles were included in
the study. Additionally, participation was voluntary, and
although not a specific requirement, herds were more
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was a member of OASV. Our study group may differ
from the source population as a result of these potential
selection biases [16]. As with any survey data, the use of
closed-ended questions may mean that some informa-
tion regarding gilt replacement strategies could have
been misclassified, resulting in a potential bias [16]. Our
decision to include the external biosecurity groups from
previous work may also serve as a limitation of this
study. Some of the variables used in the two-step cluster
analysis were also used in the MCA solutions presented
here. For the introduction strategies, 4 variables were
used in both methods; for the transportation strategies,
2 variables were used in both methods. This was done to
allow a more complete assessment of biosecurity, as it
relates to these two important areas. Additionally, the
biosecurity groups were not used in the MCA solutions;
they were supplementary variables that aided in our in-
terpretation of the plots.Conclusions
In both MCA solutions, there was a clear distinction be-
tween herds that were open with respect to replacement
animals, and herds that were closed in the 1st dimen-
sion. In regards to open herds, the 2nd dimension of
both MCA solutions revealed general patterns in intro-
duction and transportation practices, where one quad-
rant was associated with good biosecurity practices and
the opposite quadrant was associated with poorer prac-
tices. The findings from this study emphasize that evalu-
ating farms in terms of how they perform on any one
biosecurity practice has some limitations. Investigating
which practices tend to occur together to form strategies
is much more informative, and provides further insight
into a producer’s overall approach to biosecurity.
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